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*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC,1 Nicole Dussault filed a
complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission (Commission) alleging a
claim of unlawful housing discrimination.2 Dussault asserted that when RRE
Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC and Resource Real Estate Management, Inc.
(collectively, Coach Lantern) refused to include a federal Section 8 Housing
Choice Voucher Program3 tenancy addendum4 in her apartment lease, Coach
Lantern discriminated against her because of her status as a public assistance
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maine School of Law. The Author is especially grateful to
attorneys Frank D’Allessandro, Thomas Kelley, and Katherine McGovern of Pine Tree Legal Assistance
for the insights and experiences they shared in the development of this Note; Professor Sarah Schindler
for her feedback and suggestions; and the Author’s colleagues on the Maine Law Review, who provided
outstanding assistance throughout the entire publication process of volume 67, No. 1. In addition, the
Author wishes to extend special thanks to his wife, Natalie Stumpf Solotoff, for her unyielding support
during three years of law school.
1. 2014 ME 8, 86 A.3d. 52.
2. Id. ¶ 9.
3. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. Under the Section 8 Housing Voucher Program, low-income
families receive rental subsidies in order to secure a “decent place to live.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437(a) (2012).
Once a Section 8 tenant selects a housing unit, and prior to executing the lease, the local housing
authority verifies that the unit meets certain quality standards and that the landlord has satisfied certain
requirements of the program. 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.305-306 (2014).
4. Before the lease term can begin, the landlord must execute a lease with the tenant that includes a
tenancy addendum. 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.305(a)(3), (b)(1)(ii). The tenancy addendum is added word-forword to the landlord’s standard lease and sets forth: 1) the requirements of the program; and 2) the
composition of the household. 24 C.F.R. § 982.308(f) (2014). In addition, the tenant has “the right to
enforce the tenancy addendum against the [landlord], and the terms of the tenancy addendum shall
prevail over any other provisions of the lease.” Id. The addendum itself is four pages long and among
other things, requires that the landlord: 1) maintain the unit and premises in accordance with the public
housing authority’s (“PHA”) Housing Quality Standards; 2) not raise the rent during the term of the
initial lease; 3) charge no more rent than what HUD determines is “reasonable” or the “fair market
value” for the community or metropolitan area; 4) not evict a tenant for the sole reason that PHA did not
pay its share of the contract rent; 5) not evict a tenant who is a victim of domestic violence based on an
act of domestic violence committed against her; 6) open the premises to inspection by a PHA inspector
at the beginning of the lease, upon complaint by a tenant, and after the landlord has remedied a problem
identified in a prior inspection; 7) allow the PHA to not begin payments until it completes the initial
inspection; and 8) notify the PHA at least sixty days prior to any rent increase. Dussault v. RRE Coach
Lantern Holdings, LLC, 2011 Me. Super. LEXIS 226, at *3-4 (Nov. 9, 2011); see also Tenancy
Addendum Section 8 Tenant-Based Assistance Housing Choice Voucher Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS.
AND
URBAN
DEV.
(Oct.
31,
2010),
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/
huddoc?id=DOC_11738.pdf (providing the tenancy addendum that lists the Section 8 program
requirements).
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recipient.5 Following an investigation and hearing, the Commission unanimously
concluded that there were reasonable grounds for a belief of unlawful housing
discrimination.6 Dussault then brought suit in Cumberland County Superior
Court.7 Dussault alleged that Coach Lantern’s policy of not including a Section 8
tenancy addendum in its standard lease constituted housing discrimination in
violation8 of the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA).9 Specifically, Dussault
asserted three theories of discrimination under the Act: direct evidence,10 disparate
treatment,11 and disparate impact.12 The Superior Court granted Coach Lantern’s
motion for summary judgment, denied Dussault’s cross-motion for summary
judgment, and ultimately ruled for Coach Lantern on all three theories of
discrimination.13
On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,
affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Coach Lantern because the Court
concluded that Coach Lantern’s decision not to include the Section 8 tenancy
addendum did not constitute discrimination against Dussault by “refus[ing] to rent
[to] or impos[ing] different terms of tenancy” on her.14 After the Court determined
that Dussault had failed to make out a prima facie case on her claims of direct
evidence15 and disparate treatment housing discrimination,16 the Court held that the
MHRA does “not create disparate impact liability in the context of claims of
housing discrimination based on a landlord’s decision not to accept the tenancy

5. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 9, 86 A.3d 52.
6. Id.
7. Id. ¶ 10.
8. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4582 (2007), repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 613, §§ 11-12 (effective Sept. 1, 2012)
(codified at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581-A (2014)).
9. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4634 (2014). See also discussion infra Part II.B.
10. See Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407, 415 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that a prima facie housing
discrimination case requires a plaintiff to show that he or she applied for and was denied housing);
Febres v. Challengers Caribbean, Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) (describing a prima facie case
as the existence of actual direct evidence that a prohibited classification played a motivating part in an
adverse action, subject to a defendant’s burden to show that it would have made the same decision
absent the proscribed factor).
11. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (describing disparate treatment
liability in the employment setting as when an employer “treats some people less favorably than others”
because of a protected characteristic. “Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,” but can be shown by
circumstantial evidence.) (citations omitted).
12. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 1, 86 A.3d 52. Disparate impact liability involves a facially neutral
practice that “fall[s] more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required . . . .” Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609
(citation omitted). See also Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2000)
(concluding that the federal Fair Housing Act prohibits actions with an unjustified disparate racial
impact in the context of housing discrimination claims); Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231,
233 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that disparate impact liability results from “a thoughtless housing practice”
that “can be as unfair to minority rights as a willful scheme.”).
13. Id. ¶ 10.
14. Id. ¶ 16. The Court explained that there is no violation of the MHRA when a landlord offers an
apartment to “recipients of public assistance on the same terms as it offers apartments to other potential
tenants.” Id.
15. Id. ¶ 21.
16. Id. ¶ 23.
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addendum in order to participate” in the Section 8 voucher program.17 Because the
Court concluded that Dussault had also failed to establish a prima facie case on her
disparate impact claim, the Court did not “reach the issue of business necessity.”18
Writing for the majority in the Court’s 4-3 split decision, Justice Silver reasoned
that nothing in the plain language or legislative history19 of the statute “mandate[s]
that landlords accept terms of tenancy that are otherwise required only if the
landlord chooses to participate in a voluntary federal program.”20
Concurring in the result, Justice Alexander wrote to “note that the Maine
Legislature has explicitly rejected the change in the law . . . that would . . . mandate
acceptance of onerous contract conditions that come with the Section 8 program . .
. .”21 Identifying the case as an “attempt, promoted by the Maine Human Rights
Commission, to convert the Section 8 program in Maine into a compulsory
program,”22 Justice Alexander looked to the legislative history of section 4582 of
the MHRA as evidence of the Legislature’s “specific refusal to change the housing
discrimination law”23 from the Law Court’s interpretation as previously set forth in
Catir v. Commissioner of the Department of Human Services.24 Justice Alexander
further emphasized that the statute’s history was an “indicator of legislative intent
that must be respected.”25
Writing for the dissent, Justice Levy disagreed with the majority’s conclusion
that Coach Lantern did not “refuse to rent” to Dussault within the meaning of
section 4582 of the MHRA.26 The dissent concurred that the MHRA does not
make participation in the Section 8 program mandatory for landlords.27 However,
the dissent asserted that the majority misconstrued the statute’s language “to refuse
to rent . . . to any individual . . . primarily because of the individual’s status as [a]
recipient”28 as prohibiting only intentional discrimination, “and not housing
decisions that have a disparate impact on such recipients.”29 Therefore, as a matter
of statutory construction, the dissent relied on the plain meaning,30 structure,31 and
17. Id. ¶ 29.
18. Id. The majority disagreed with the dissent’s interpretation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 4583 (2007) as
effectively compelling “Maine’s landlords to participate in a voluntary federal housing subsidy program
or risk having to litigate whether their decision not to participate is based on a ‘business necessity.’” Id.
¶ 28.
19. Id. ¶ 19.
20. Id. ¶ 18.
21. Id. ¶ 31 (Alexander, J., concurring).
22. Id. ¶ 33. Justice Alexander asserted that the Commission was trying to “secure by judicial
action an amendment to the housing discrimination laws that the Maine Legislature explicitly refused to
adopt.” Id.
23. Id. ¶ 35. See also discussion infra Part II.B.2.
24. 543 A.2d 356 (Me. 1988). See also discussion infra Part II.B.3.
25. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 35, 86 A.3d 52.
26. Id. ¶ 38 (Levy, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4582 (2007) repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 613, §§ 11-12 (effective Sept. 1, 2012)
(codified at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581-A (2014)).
29. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 44, 86 A.3d 52 (Levy, J., dissenting).
30. See id. ¶ 46.
31. See id. ¶ 47 (noting that a construction of section 4582 to include disparate impact liability is
“confirmed by viewing it in conjunction with the business necessity defense established in section
4583.”).
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legislative history of the statute to support its contention that disparate impact
liability is available to public assistance recipients who assert claims of housing
discrimination under the MHRA.32 Together with the United States Supreme
Court’s implicit adoption of disparate impact liability in the employment setting,33
the dissent concluded that the “Legislature’s intent to subject claims of housing
discrimination based on the receipt of public assistance payments to disparate
impact analysis . . . could not be clearer.”34 Because Coach Lantern failed to meet
its burden of showing that an actual business necessity justified its decision to
refuse to include a Section 8 tenancy addendum in its lease agreements, and
because Dussault’s prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination went
unrebutted, the dissent would have granted Dussault’s motion for summary
judgment and denied summary judgment for Coach Lantern.35
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Dussault highlight the
three primary fault lines in other cases challenging the application of Section 8 to
state laws that have codified housing protections for recipients of public assistance:
First, courts have been asked to interpret whether Section 8 housing vouchers
constitute a form of public assistance, which would consequently implicate laws
protecting an individual’s status as a public aid recipient.36 Second, courts have
confronted the question of whether participation in the federal Section 8 housing
program is voluntary or mandatory for landlords.37 Third, courts have taken up the
question of whether Section 8 tenants may assert disparate impact claims when
landlords refuse to accept the housing vouchers because of the program’s
administrative requirements.38 Although the Supreme Court has never directly
ruled on the application of the disparate impact standard to the federal Fair Housing
Act,39 every federal court of appeals, with the exception of the D.C. Circuit, has
determined that liability exists for housing practices that have discriminatory
effects.40
32. See id. ¶ 48.
33. See id. ¶ 46 (referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-36 (1971), which held that disparate impact liability is recognized by Title VII’s prohibition
against racially discriminatory employment tests).
34. Id. ¶ 48.
35. Id. ¶ 59.
36. See, e.g., Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 333 (Md. 2007) (holding
that source of income protections include Section 8 voucher holders). But see Knapp v. Eagle Prop.
Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Wisconsin housing protection statute
does not incorporate Section 8 vouchers as a source of income).
37. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 245
(Conn. 1999) (discussing in detail whether federal preemption makes participation in the Section 8
program voluntary for landlords).
38. See Tamica H. Daniel, Note, Bringing Real Choice to the Housing Choice Voucher Program:
Addressing Voucher Discrimination Under the Federal Fair Housing Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 769, 788 (2010)
(discussing courts which have both upheld and rejected disparate impact claims made by Section 8
recipients under the federal Fair Housing Act).
39. See Robert G. Schwemm & Sara K. Pratt, Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act: A Proposed
Approach, NAT’L FAIR HOUS. ALLIANCE 4 (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/portals/33/
disparate%20impact%20analysis%20final.pdf
40. See id. at 6-7. Moreover, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
promulgated a final rule in 2013 establishing uniform standards for evaluating disparate impact claims
under the FHA. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a) (2014).

188

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1

Thus, the Law Court’s decision—to hold “as a matter of law, that the MHRA,
as currently established . . . does not create disparate impact liability” for housing
discrimination claims made by Section 8 recipients—represents just one point on a
spectrum of court decisions that have interpreted similar public assistance
antidiscrimination housing statutes in other states.41 Within this context, this Note
considers whether the Court’s holding was a principled approach to statutory
interpretation, or whether the Court hastily adopted a rule precluding disparate
impact liability for claims of housing discrimination when brought by Section 8
recipients.
This Note proceeds first in Part II by reviewing the federal and state laws
underlying the Court’s decision in Dussault. After describing the application of the
MHRA to housing discrimination claims, Part II examines the legislative history of
sections 4582 and 4583, as well as the Court’s previous decision in Catir. Part III
describes the facts, procedural history, and arguments on appeal, as well as the
Court’s decision and accompanying concurring and dissenting opinions. Part IV
analyzes the implications of the Court’s holding and concludes that although the
Court reasonably concluded that disparate impact liability is not available for
Section 8 recipients under the MHRA, the Court’s construction of the MHRA was
strikingly narrow in light of the statute’s purpose and was inconsistent with general
principles of statutory construction. This Note closes by recommending that the
Maine Legislature amend the MHRA to expressly include protections against
discrimination for Section 8 recipients.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Federal Fair Housing Laws & Public Assistance Housing Discrimination
1. The Federal Fair Housing Act
Known today as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Title VIII),42
Congress passed the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) in order to achieve two
principle goals: eliminating housing discrimination in public and private spheres
and increasing the overall availability of access to housing opportunities for all
Americans.43 The Act was passed soon after the summer of 1967, during which
time rioting and civil disturbances “rocked the central cores of many of the nation’s
major cities.”44 At the time, President Lyndon B. Johnson appointed a commission
to “focus[] attention on the discontent of the people trapped in the nation’s
ghettoes,” and to examine the “problems of residential segregation and racial slum

41. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 26, 86 A.3d 52. See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
42. See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012)).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012) (stating that “[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide . . .
for fair housing throughout the United States”); Kinara Flagg, Comment, Mending the Safety Net
Through Source of Income Protections: The Nexus Between Antidiscrimination and Social Welfare Law,
20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 201, 229 (2011).
44. Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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formation.”45 As enacted, the FHA provides that “it shall be unlawful . . . [t]o
refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”46
The Supreme Court has stated that the language and interpretation of Title VIII is
“broad and inclusive.”47 Following enactment of the FHA, Congress amended the
Act to include protections based on sex,48 people with disabilities, and families
with children.49 Although the FHA does not expressly prohibit discrimination on
the basis of receipt of public assistance, a number of other federal statutes have
included such protections.50
2. The Section 8 Housing Program
As a Depression-era statute, Congress enacted the United States Housing Act
in 1937.51 Public housing projects were the dominant form of low-income housing
assistance until Congress passed the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1965.52 In 1974, Congress passed the Housing and Community Development Act
which created the federal fair housing program known today as Section 8.53 The
Section 8 program was established “[f]or the purpose of aiding low-income
families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed
housing . . . .”54 In 1987, Congress enacted a rental voucher program as part of a
second Housing and Community Development Act.55 It was not until 1998 that
Congress merged its 1974 certificate and 1987 voucher programs into a single
Housing Choice Voucher Program.56
As it currently operates, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) is authorized to enter into annual contracts with local

45. Id. The Commission also “recognized that discrimination in housing is a major contributing
factor to racial isolation in urban schools.” Id. at 497.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
47. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
48. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808, 88 Stat.
633, 728-29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (2012)).
49. See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012)).
50. See Flagg, supra note 43, at 216-20 (discussing statutory protections on the basis of source of
income in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
program, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
51. See Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 327 (Md. 2007) (noting that
the Act’s purpose was to develop additional housing stock, create jobs, clear slums, and to provide funds
for local housing agencies to build and manage public housing projects).
52. Id. at 328. The 1965 Act “authorized a new program under which [public housing agencies],
through contracts with private owners, could lease apartment units in existing private apartment
buildings and then sublease those units to current public housing tenants.” Id.
53. Id. The Section 8 name stems from an authorization to rewrite § 8 of the United States Housing
Act of 1937. Id. at 328 n.1.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2012).
55. See Glenmont Hills, 936 A.2d at 329.
56. See id.
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public housing agencies (PHAs),57 which in turn make assistance payments to
owners of existing rental units.58 Historically, Section 8 provided two types of
public housing assistance: project-based59 and tenant-based.60 The tenant-based
program—also known as the Housing Choice Voucher Program—first establishes
fair market rents for each region within the United States.61 The local PHA then
adopts a payment schedule corresponding to its rental region, which must fall
within ninety percent and one hundred ten percent of the relevant fair market rent.62
In order for an individual to qualify for Section 8 rental assistance, that individual
must be classified as either very low income or low income.63 A tenant identifies a
suitable home within the reasonable rent guidelines and pays a portion of the rental
cost commensurate with his or her income, typically thirty-percent of adjusted
gross income.64
Before the lease is finalized, the local PHA confirms that the tenant-selected
property meets HUD quality and market rate standards.65 This process entails: 1) a
physical inspection of the apartment by the local PHA to ensure quality
compliance;66 2) confirmation that the rent falls within the established market
rate;67 and 3) verification that the lease conforms with HUD requirements,
including incorporation of a HUD-prepared tenancy addendum setting forth the
rights of the tenant and landlord.68 Thus, once approved, the Section 8
collaboration between state and local PHAs and HUD provides subsidies to
landlords who rent to low-income tenants.69
3. Federal and State Law Protections for Section 8 Recipients
Under federal law, landlords are neither expressly required to participate in the
57. See 24 C.F.R. § 5.100 (2014) (defining a public housing agency as “[a]ny State, county,
municipality or other governmental entity or public body (or agency or instrumentality thereof) which is
authorized to engage in or assist in the development or operation of housing for low-income Families”).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b) (2012).
59. See Rebecca Tracy Rotem, Note, Using Disparate Impact Analysis in Fair Housing Act Claims:
Landlord Withdrawal From the Section 8 Voucher Program, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971, 1977 (2010)
(describing the large-scale public building projects as “concentrating the misery and hopelessness of
poverty in large, segregated projects”) (citation omitted).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b) (2014).
61. 24 C.F.R. § 888.113 (2014).
62. 24 C.F.R. § 982.503(b)(1)(i) (2014).
63. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.201(a)-(b) (2014) (listing Section 8 income eligibility requirements).
64. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.503, 505, 515 (2014); see also Housing Choice Voucher Program
Guidebook, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. 7-6, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
documents/huddoc?id=DOC_11751.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(o)(8)(A)-(B) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 (2014). For a graphic illustration
of the process by which the Section 8 program is administered, see Housing Choice Voucher Program
Guidebook, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. 1-16, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/
huddoc?id=DOC_11745.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).
66. 24 C.F.R. § 982.401 (2014).
67. 24 C.F.R. § 982.507 (2014).
68. See Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 330 (Md. 2007).
69. Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 12 (1993). For an overview of the delivery of
statewide affordable housing programs in Maine, see Blue Ribbon Commission on Affordable Housing,
Final Report to the 125th Legislature 11-13 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.maine.gov/legis/opla/
AffordableHousingStudyrpt.pdf [hereinafter Blue Ribbon Report].
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Section 8 program, nor must they accept Section 8 vouchers as payment.70 Instead,
selection of a tenant is left to the discretion of the landlord,71 subject to prohibitions
against refusing to rent based on a tenant’s color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
familial status, or disability.72 The Section 8 program, therefore, functions as a
“cooperative venture” between HUD and state and local PHAs that oversee the
The federal legislation and accompanying
program’s daily operations.73
regulations, therefore, are “superimposed upon and consciously interdependent
with the sub-structure of local law relating to housing.”74 Because the “[f]ederal
statute merely creates the scheme and sets out the guidelines for the funding and
implementation of the program . . . [i]t does not preclude State regulation.”75
Thirteen states have adopted laws—similar in nature, but each worded slightly
differently—prohibiting housing discrimination based on a tenant’s source of
income.76 In addition, a number of local municipalities have also approved
ordinances that incorporate housing discrimination protections for individuals who
rely upon public assistance.77 Given the lack of textual uniformity and the absence
of federal legislation expressly prohibiting discrimination against Section 8
recipients,78 reviewing courts have produced a wide spectrum of decisions in
70. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.302(b) (2014) (providing that “[i]f the family finds a unit, and the owner is
willing to lease the unit under the program, the family may request PHA approval of the tenancy.”); see
also Glenmont Hills, 936 A.2d at 330.
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(A) (2012); see also Comm’n on Human Rights and Opportunities
v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 245 n.22 (Conn. 1999) (emphasizing that there is “no express
language in 42 U.S.C. § 1437f to the effect that landlord participation in section 8 programs is
voluntary,” but that those courts which have found the program to be voluntary have relied on 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437(f)(d)(1)(A) as well as the regulations under 24 C.F.R. § 982.452(b)(1) which give landlords
authority to select a voucher holder and to determine rental eligibility).
72. 24 C.F.R. § 982.304 (2014).
73. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d at 244.
74. Attorney Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Mass. 1987) (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 1106.
76. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12955(a), (p)(1) (West 2014) (including a definition for “source of
income”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-63 (3); 46a-64c (a)(1) (West 2014) (including a definition for
“lawful source of income”); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.21(e) (2014) (explicitly protecting Section 8
recipients); 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581-A (2014) (protecting individuals on the basis of their “status” as
recipients); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(10) (West 2014) (prohibiting discrimination against
public assistance or rental subsidy recipients, or “because of any requirement of such” programs); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 363A.09(1) (West 2014) (including “status with regard to public assistance”); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-12(g)(1) (West 2014) (precluding housing discrimination on the basis of “source
of lawful income”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-01 (West 2014) (including “status with regard to
. . . public assistance”); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 25 § 1452(A)(8) (West 2014) (defining unlawful housing
discrimination as refusing to consider as a “valid source of income any public assistance”); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 659a.421(1)(d) (West 2014) (prohibiting source of income discrimination but specifically
excluding Section 8 “rent subsidy payments under 42 U.S.C. § 1437f”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-5(1)
(West 2014) (prohibiting “source of income” discrimination); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4503(a)(1) (West
2014) (precluding discrimination “because a person is a recipient of public assistance”); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 106.50(1) (West 2014) (rendering discrimination on the basis of “lawful source of income” as
unlawful).
77. See Krista Sterken, A Different Type of Housing Crisis: Allocating Costs Fairly and
Encouraging Landlord Participation in Section 8, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 215, 223 nn.42-44
(2009) (listing municipal ordinances with source of income housing protections).
78. See Jenna Bernstein, Note, Section 8, Source of Income Discrimination, and Federal
Preemption: Setting the Record Straight, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1407, 1415-16 (2010) (noting that since
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response to parties who challenge the application of state public assistance
antidiscrimination housing laws to Section 8 recipients.79
B. The MHRA and Maine’s Fair Housing Protections for
Recipients of Public Assistance
1. Unlawful Housing Discrimination Under the MHRA
Recognizing a “basic human right to a life with dignity,”80 the Maine
Legislature enacted the Maine Human Rights Act in 1971 to “prevent
discrimination in employment, housing or access to public accommodations” on
account of a protected trait.81 Discrimination, as defined in the statute, “includes,
without limitation, [to] segregate or separate.”82 The MHRA did not originally
include a prohibition against housing discrimination for public assistance recipients
seeking rental property. Instead, the MHRA codified a civil right to obtain “decent
housing” without fear of discrimination on the basis of the limited classifications of
“race, color, religious creed, ancestry or national origin.”83
Although recipients of public assistance were not included in section 4581’s
original listing of individuals entitled to “decent housing,” as of October 1, 1975,
the Legislature amended section 4582 in order to add protections for recipients of
public assistance.84 Specifically, section 4582 provided, in relevant part, that it
shall be unlawful:
For any person furnishing rental premises to refuse to rent or impose different
terms of tenancy to any individual who is a recipient of federal, state or local
public assistance, including medical assistance and housing subsidies solely
85
because of such individual’s status as such recipient.

Congressional repeal of the “take one, take all” requirement from the Section 8 program, Congress has
not imposed any new requirements on landlords).
79. See, e.g., Montgomery Cnty. v. Glenmont Hills Assocs., 936 A.2d 325, 342 (Md. 2007) (holding
that Glenmont Hills discriminated by refusing to rent to otherwise qualified tenants because they
proposed to use Section 8 vouchers, thereby discriminating on the basis of source of income); Comm’n
on Human Rights and Opportunities v. Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 251 (Conn. 1999) (holding that
the legislature intended to require landlords to accept section 8 vouchers). But see Knapp v. Eagle Prop.
Mgmt. Corp., 54 F.3d 1272, 1283 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that section 8 assistance does not fall
within the statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of lawful source of income); Edwards v.
Hopkins Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 783 N.W.2d 171, 177-78 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a landlord’s
refusal to continue participation in the voluntary section 8 program does not constitute unlawful status
discrimination). Although not discussed by this Note, challengers have also argued that the voluntary
nature of Section 8 participation under federal law preempts any mandatory protections for public
assistance recipients under state law. See, e.g., Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 725 A.2d 1104,
1111-12 (N.J. 1999) (reviewing the preemption argument and applicable case law); Bernstein, supra
note 78, at 1408.
80. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4552 (2014).
81. P.L. 1971, ch. 501, § 1 (emphasis added).
82. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4553(2) (2014).
83. P.L. 1971, ch. 501, § 1. Section 4581 has since been amended to declare a civil right to be free
from discrimination in housing because of an individual’s “race, color, sex, sexual orientation, physical
or mental disability, religion, ancestry, national origin or familial status.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581 (2014).
84. P.L. 1975, ch. 151, § 1.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
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Section 4583 was also amended in 1975 to conform with the adjustments to
section 4582.86 It provided, in relevant part, that:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed in any manner to prohibit or limit the
exercise of the privilege of every person and the agent of any person having the
right to sell, rent, lease or manage a housing accommodation to set up and enforce
specifications in the selling, renting, leasing, or letting thereof . . . which are not
based on race, color, sex, physical handicap, religion or country of ancestral
origin, the receipt of public assistance payments of any prospective or actual
87
purchaser, lessee, tenant or occupant thereof.

In 1989, the Maine Legislature further amended section 4582, and substituted
the word “primarily” for the word “solely” when evaluating the issue of causation
by a landlord’s refusal to rent in connection with that individual’s status as a
recipient of public assistance.88
Most recently, in 2007, the Legislature modified section 4583 of the MHRA
and expressly codified for the first time a “business necessity” defense for
landlords,89 as well as the availability of disparate impact liability for
discrimination against a protected class.90 Under the current language of the Act,
unless a landlord can demonstrate a business necessity justifying refusal, a landlord
may not “refuse to rent or impose different terms of tenancy on any individual who
is a recipient of . . . public assistance . . . primarily because of the individual’s
status” as a public aid recipient.91
2. The Legislative History of Sections 4582 and 4583 of the MHRA
The Statement of Fact that accompanied the Legislature’s 1975 amendment to
the unlawful housing provisions of the MHRA found that landlords who refused to
rent to public assistance recipients discriminated because such “refusals to rent . . .
are not made with reference to the tenant’s personal responsibility and integrity; but
only on the general misapprehension that a family on public assistance is
automatically an undesirable tenant.”92 Moreover, the stated purpose of the bill
amending the MHRA was to “enable those citizens of Maine most in need of
housing to have a fair and equal chance at obtaining it.”93 However, when the
86. P.L. 1975, ch. 151, § 2.
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. P.L. 1989, ch. 245, § 4. In Vance v. Speakman, the Court reviewed the addition of the more
restrictive word “solely” to the last paragraph of section 4582. 409 A.2d 1307, 1309 (Me. 1979). The
Court noted, that whereas “all of the provisions of the Human Rights Act prohibit discrimination that is
merely ‘because of,’” as opposed to “‘solely because of’ factors such as age, race, or sex,” in the case of
landlords and extenders of credit, the legislature granted “a more restrictive test than that prevailing for
employment and other forms of prohibited discrimination.” Id. at 1309-10.
89. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4583 (2007) (stating in relevant part that “[n]othing in this Act may be construed
to prohibit or limit the exercise of the privilege of every person . . . having the right to sell, rent, lease or
manage a housing accommodation to set up and enforce specifications in the selling, renting, leasing or
letting . . . that are consistent with business necessity and are not based on . . . the receipt of public
assistance payments by any prospective or actual purchaser, lessee, tenant, or occupant.”).
90. See L.D. 685, Summary (123rd Legis. 2007).
91. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581-A(4) (2014).
92. L.D. 327, Statement of Fact (107th Legis. 1975).
93. Id.
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Legislature next amended section 4582 of the MHRA in 2007, the Legislature
explicitly rejected a section from the final bill amendment that would have
prohibited a landlord from refusing to rent to or imposing different terms of
tenancy on any individual “primarily because of the individual’s status as [a]
recipient or because of any requirement of such a public assistance program.”94
In 2007, the Maine Human Rights Commission introduced L.D. 685 in order to
“clarify the protections of the Act . . . and [to] prohibit unreasonable housing
practices that have a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, sex, sexual
orientation, physical or mental disability, religion, country of ancestral origin,
familial status or the receipt of public assistance payments.”95 The amendment, as
proposed by the Maine Human Rights Commission in L.D. 685, was intended to
“ensure that a housing provider cannot refuse to rent or impose different terms of
tenancy because of the requirements of a public assistance program,” and was also
proposed to address “a recurring problem with landlords arguing that they do not
want to do paperwork or comply with other requirements of public assistance
programs such as Section 8.”96
Section 2 of L.D. 685 was modeled after a similar amendment to
Massachusetts law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of receipt of public
assistance.97 The modification to Maine law, as proposed by the Maine Human
Rights Commission, was designed to ensure that “a housing provider [could not]
refuse to rent or impose different terms of tenancy because of the . . . paperwork or
other program requirements” of a public assistance program.98 However, at a
public hearing on L.D. 685, representatives for the Maine Apartment Owners and
Managers Association testified that some Section 8 requirements were “too
burdensome” for landlords.99
Consistent with the Commission’s recommendation that section 4582
precluded discriminatory housing practices that have a disparate impact, the
Commission also proposed an amendment to section 4583. By adding the language
“consistent with business necessity” to the operation of section 4583, the
Commission sought to resolve a conflict in which “a bona fide neutral practice
[could not] be challenged, even if it has a disparate impact on a protected class.”100
On May 29, 2007, the Judiciary Committee expressly amended L.D. 685 “by
striking out all of section 2” containing the language prohibiting housing
discrimination against public assistance recipients because of a program’s
requirements.101 All other provisions within L.D. 685, including the “business
94. L.D. 685, § 2 (123rd Legis. 2007) (emphasis added).
95. An Act to Amend the Maine Human Rights Act: Hearing on L.D. 685 Before the Joint Standing
Comm. on Judiciary, L.D. 685 at 1-2 (123rd Legis. 2007) [hereinafter Ryan Letter] (emphasis added)
(letter from Ms. Patricia Ryan, Exec. Dir. of the Maine Human Rights Comm’n.).
96. Id. at 2.
97. See DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 421, 422 n.2 (Mass. 2007) (citation
omitted).
98. An Act to Amend the Maine Human Rights Act: Hearing on L.D. 685 Before the Joint Standing
Comm. on Judiciary, L.D. 685 at 1 (123rd Legis. 2007) (memorandum from Ms. Peggy Reinsch, Office
of Policy and Legal Analysis).
99. Id.
100. Ryan Letter, supra note 95, at 4-5.
101. Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 685, No. S-162 (123rd Legis. 2008).
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necessity” modification of section 4583, were enacted with the exception of the
change proposed by section 2.102
3. The Catir Decision
The Law Court previously interpreted the language of section 4582 of the
MHRA in Catir v. Commissioner of the Department of Human Services.103 In
Catir, the Law Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment for a nursing home
when there was “no allegation or suggestion that the nursing home refused to rent
or imposed different terms of tenancy on Medicaid recipients.”104 When the
nursing home decided that it would no longer accept the Medicaid rate of payment
or patients unable to pay the nursing home’s higher rate, several Medicaid
recipients brought suit under the MHRA to enjoin the nursing home from
discontinuing their services.105 Although the plaintiffs alleged that section 4582 of
the MHRA prohibited the nursing home from terminating services for Medicaid
recipients,106 the Court concluded that the nursing home refused to accept the
Medicaid rate of payment and “subjected the recipients to the same terms of
tenancy offered to any other individual.”107 Moreover, the Court noted that fair
housing access under the MHRA is “premised upon the assumption that the persons
seeking the housing have the ability to pay.”108
III. DUSSAULT V. RRE COACH LANTERN HOLDINGS, LLC
A. Factual Background
In June 2008, Nicole Dussault and her three children found themselves
homeless after Dussault’s home was foreclosed upon.109 Dussault obtained a rental
assistance voucher on July 14, 2008 pursuant to the Section 8 Housing Choice
Voucher program administered by Avesta Housing, a nonprofit organization
contracted by the Maine State Housing Authority.110 On August 5, 2008, Dussault
called Coach Lantern Apartments in Scarborough to inquire about renting a threebedroom apartment that she had identified on Craigslist.111 The dwelling’s rental
rate was within the limits of the voucher program and the Scarborough location
allowed Dussault to keep her son in the same school system he had previously
attended.112 The apartment complex was owned by RRE Coach Lantern Holdings,
LLC.113
102. See P.L. 2007, ch. 243.
103. 543 A.2d 356 (Me. 1988).
104. Id. at 357-58 (quotations omitted).
105. Id. at 357.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 358.
108. Id.
109. Brief for Appellant at 1, Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 2014 ME 8, 86 A.3d
52 (No. CUM-11-591).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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Dussault alleged that when she disclosed that she intended to use a voucher to
help pay the rent, she was informed that Coach Lantern did not accept vouchers.114
Dussault’s Preble Street caseworker was told the same thing after calling on
Dussault’s behalf.115 About two weeks later, Dussault called Coach Lantern again
and refrained from disclosing her intent to use a voucher.116 After successfully
scheduling and being shown the apartment, Dussault was given and completed a
rental application.117 On the application, Dussault indicated that she would be
using a voucher to pay the rent.118 Dussault was accepted after qualifying for an
apartment.119
Pursuant to federal regulations, the Avesta caseworker notified Coach Lantern
that it was required to include a HUD tenancy addendum in Dussault’s lease as a
condition of Section 8 and in order for Dussault to use the voucher.120 On
September 3, 2008, Coach Lantern, through its attorney, notified Avesta Housing
in writing of its “problem with the inclusion of a Tenancy Addendum with [the
standard] lease.”121 The attorney’s letter further stated that:
I wish to make it absolutely clear that my client is not refusing to rent to [Dussault]
primarily because she is a recipient of public assistance, but because [t]he
addendum includes more restrictive rights and obligations on the landlord th[a]n
the standard lease that they use, and my client does not wish to be bound by these
122
more restrictive obligations.

On September 12, 2008, Avesta Housing replied by email, informing Coach
Lantern that it had to include the tenancy addendum in order to rent to Dussault.123
Coach Lantern refused to attach the tenancy addendum to Dussault’s lease.124
Furthermore, Coach Lantern objected to seven different requirements of the
addendum ranging from housing quality standards to eviction restrictions to
inspection requirements.125 Dussault did not rent the apartment, and ultimately
found housing in South Portland because she was unable to use the voucher to rent
the Coach Lantern apartment.126
B. Procedural History
Dussault filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission in
November 2008, alleging that Coach Lantern violated section 4582 of the MHRA
and that its policy of refusing to attach the HUD tenancy addendum to her lease
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 4, 86 A.3d 52.
120. Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at 1.
121. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 6, 86 A.3d 52.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. ¶ 7. See also Brief for Appellees at 5, Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC, 2014
ME 8, 86 A.3d 52 (No. CUM-11-591).
125. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 7, 86 A.3d 52.
126. Id. ¶ 8.
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constituted discrimination on the basis of her status as a recipient of public
assistance.127 The Commission completed an investigation and unanimously
concluded that reasonable grounds existed to believe that unlawful housing
discrimination had occurred against Dussault because of her status as a public aid
recipient.128
Dussault then filed a complaint in Superior Court to obtain declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, and damages.129 In response to Coach Lantern’s motion for
summary judgment, Dussault filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on three
theories of discrimination: direct evidence, disparate treatment, and disparate
impact.130 The trial court granted Coach Lantern’s motion for summary judgment
and denied Dussault’s cross-motion.131 The court ruled in favor of Coach Lantern
on each of the three theories of discrimination.132
The trial court first concluded that there was no direct evidence of
discrimination and, therefore, declined to conduct a mixed-motives analysis.133
The court next determined that Dussault failed to meet her burden to produce
sufficient evidence that Coach Lantern’s proffered reasons for refusing to
participate in the voucher program were pretextual under the three-step burdenshifting analysis which courts apply to identify circumstantial evidence of
discrimination.134 Lastly, the court performed a disparate impact analysis and
determined that Coach Lantern’s policy of refusing to attach the HUD addendum
affects public assistance recipients more harshly than those who do not intend to
use vouchers, but that Coach Lantern’s actions were justified by the business
necessity defense.135
Dussault appealed.136
C. Arguments on Appeal
On appeal, Dussault asserted three arguments: First, Dussault argued that
under the plain language of the statute, receipt of a Section 8 subsidy is included in
“public assistance protection.”137 Accordingly, Dussault asserted that Coach
Lantern’s refusal to include the Section 8 addendum constituted unlawful
discrimination contrary to legislative intent.138 Dussault also argued that the court
erred in failing to defer to the prior interpretations and approach of the Maine
Human Rights Commission,139 and that when reading the entire statutory scheme of
sections 4582 and 4583 as a whole, the Legislature’s incorporation of the business

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See id. ¶ 9.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See supra note 10.
Id. See supra note 11.
Id. See supra note 12.
Id. ¶ 11.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 109, at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 16.
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necessity defense “ameliorates any negative inference that might be drawn from the
Judiciary Committee’s election to drop” the language making it illegal housing
discrimination to refuse to rent “because of any requirement of such a public
assistance program.”140 Dussault also argued that the trial court erred in its
application of the business necessity defense141 because Coach Lantern had failed
to offer any “credible admissible evidence that demonstrates that any of their
objections meet the business necessity standard.”142
Second, Dussault asserted that the court erred in denying summary judgment
on her claim of direct evidence discrimination.143 Dussault argued that Coach
Lantern’s “overt refusal to sign the lease amendment is direct evidence of
Defendants’ intent to discriminate.”144 Because Coach Lantern admitted its
willingness to rent to Dussault based on her individual characteristics,145 Dussault
argued that Coach Lantern had no legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for denying
Dussault the opportunity to rent.146 Finally, Dussault argued that Coach Lantern’s
assertions of administrative burdens were not supported by sufficient and
admissible record evidence.147
Coach Lantern, on the other hand, argued in response that “[t]he language of
the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA), its legislative history, and a large body of
case law regarding discrimination indicate” that Section 8 participation is not
mandatory.148 In support of its argument, Coach Lantern asserted that the trial
court “correctly concluded that Coach Lantern did not violate the MHRA because
nothing in the statute, legislative history, or the law of discrimination generally
requires landlords to accept less favorable terms in order to make it possible for a
recipient of public assistance to rent.”149 Arguing under the plain language of the
statute, Coach Lantern asserted that “the statute requires nothing more than equal
treatment: that landlords offer recipients of public assistance housing on the same
terms and conditions they offer housing to everyone else and that they not refuse to
rent to an individual because of stereotypes about welfare recipients.”150 Pointing
to the fact that the legislature “enacted each and every proposed amendment to the
MHRA contained within L.D. 685 except the provision that would have made it
unlawful to refuse to rent to a recipient of public assistance because of the burdens
associated with the program,” Coach Lantern asserted that legislative inaction
meant that the “Legislature did not want to make participation in programs such as
Section 8 mandatory.”151 Coach Lantern further argued that Commission decisions
are not entitled to any deference because they lack precedential or persuasive
140. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis omitted).
141. Id. at 22.
142. Id. at 26.
143. Id. at 27.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 29 (noting that Coach Lantern was not concerned with Dussault’s personal history,
criminal history, past rental history, bad references, or an inability to pay the rent).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 36-37.
148. Brief for Appellees, supra note 124, at 2.
149. Id. at 6.
150. Id. at 8.
151. Id. at 14.
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force.152
Coach Lantern additionally asserted that there was no evidence that
“Dussault’s status as a recipient of public assistance—as opposed to burdens
associated with participating in Section 8—was a motivating factor, let alone the
primary factor” in Coach Lantern’s decision not to include the HUD tenancy
addendum in its standard lease.153 Furthermore, Coach Lantern clarified that
“endeavoring to maintain as much control as possible over the terms of tenancy and
not wanting to incur additional costs and burdens associated with Section 8
participation are legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not renting to tenants
who require a Section 8 subsidy.”154 Finding Catir to be on point, Coach Lantern
stated that “[t]here is no practical difference between what the nursing home was
being asked to give up in Catir and what Ms. Dussault contends Coach Lantern is
required to give up in this case.”155 In both instances, “the defendant was sued for
failing to do business on terms less favorable than it did business with others.”156
Lastly, Coach Lantern distinguished its refusal to contract on more onerous
terms from a “policy or practice” that has a disparate impact on recipients of public
assistance.157 Identifying the former as a “refusal to undertake an affirmative act, at
a cost,” Coach Lantern asserted that the trial court correctly granted summary
judgment on Dussault’s claim of disparate impact liability because Dussault had
failed to identify any facially neutral policy or practice, and alternatively, that
Coach Lantern’s actions were supported by legitimate business reasons.158
D. Decision of the Law Court
Justice Silver, writing for the majority, first synthesized the language of
sections 4582 and 4583 to mean that “a landlord may not refuse to rent to, or
impose different terms of tenancy on” a public assistance recipient unless the
landlord can demonstrate a business necessity justifying refusal.159 The Court
further explained that the plain language of section 4582’s prohibition against
“refus[al] to rent or impos[ition of] different terms of tenancy” is narrower than the
broader prohibitions of housing discrimination on other protected bases under the
MHRA.160 After reviewing the Court’s previous holding in Catir v. Commissioner
of the Department of Human Services,161 the majority concluded that the
“undisputed facts demonstrate that Coach Lantern did not ‘refuse to rent [to] or
impose different terms of tenancy’ on Dussault.”162 The Court noted that Coach
152. Id. at 17-18.
153. Id. at 23.
154. Id. at 27.
155. Id. at 29.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 31.
158. Id. at 31-39.
159. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 13, 86 A.3d. 52.
160. Id. ¶ 14 (alterations in original) (emphasizing that to “refuse to show or refuse to sell, rent, lease,
let or otherwise deny to or withhold from any individual housing accommodation because of the race or
color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, religion, ancestry, national origin or familial
status of the individual” would constitute a violation of the MHRA).
161. 543 A.2d 356, 357-58 (Me. 1988).
162. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 16, 86 A.3d 52 (alteration in original).
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Lantern offered and was willing to rent the apartment to Dussault after learning of
her status, “so long as it could do so without including the tenancy addendum.”163
The Court stated that “[i]n essence, Coach Lantern offered to rent the apartment to
Dussault on ‘the same terms of tenancy offered to any other individual.’”164 Thus,
the Court concluded that there was no violation of the MHRA because Coach
Lantern was willing to offer the apartment to Dussault on the same terms that it
offered apartments to other prospective tenants.165
Turning to the statute itself, the Court explained why section 4582’s language,
purpose, and legislative history precluded any attempt to “read into the MHRA a
mandate that landlords accept terms of tenancy that are otherwise required only if
the landlord chooses to participate in a voluntary federal program.”166 First, the
Court stated that Coach Lantern refused to include the tenancy addendum not
“primarily because of [Dussault’s] status as recipient,” but because Coach Lantern
“did not wish to bind itself to the terms of the tenancy addendum.”167 Second, the
Court “recognize[d] the MHRA’s purpose to protect public assistance recipients’
rights to secure decent housing,” but declined to “read into the MHRA a mandate
that landlords accept terms of tenancy that are otherwise required only if the
landlord chooses to participate in a voluntary federal program.”168 Third, the Court
felt constrained by the “language that the Legislature ha[d] enacted;”169 although
the “Legislature ha[d] considered a bill that would have effectively required
landlords to participate in the voucher program,” the Court was unwilling to
“substitute [its] policy judgment for that of the Legislature.”170
Next, the Court raised and analyzed each of the three theories of unlawful
discrimination asserted by Dussault in light of its preceding analysis of the
MHRA.171 With respect to the claim of direct evidence discrimination, the Court
examined whether Dussault’s “status as a public assistance recipient was a
‘motivating factor’ in the landlord’s refusal to rent to her.”172 The Court concluded
that Dussault failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination on this theory
because “the undisputed facts demonstrate that, in declining to include the tenancy
addendum in the lease, Coach Lantern did not ‘refuse to rent or impose different
terms of tenancy’ on Dussault based primarily upon her status as a recipient of
public assistance.”173 In analyzing Dussault’s disparate treatment claim, the Court
similarly concluded that Dussault failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.174 Again, the Court determined that Coach Lantern’s decision was
not “based primarily upon [Dussault’s] status as a recipient of public assistance.”175
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 17 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶ 19.
Id.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶ 21.
Id.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id.
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Finally, drawing on the Court’s burden-shifting analysis for disparate impact
claims made in the employment context, the Court concluded that “[n]othing in the
language of the MHRA . . . imposes disparate impact liability on a landlord for
discrimination against an individual because of the individual’s status as a recipient
of public assistance.”176 Rather than broadening the protections available to public
assistance recipients, the Court viewed the business necessity defense under section
4583 as a limitation on their rights.177 Finding nothing expressly in the text of the
statute or its history, the Court concluded “as a matter of law, that the MHRA, as
currently established by the Maine Legislature, does not create disparate impact
liability” for housing discrimination claims based on a landlord’s refusal to
“participate in the voluntary voucher program established by Section 8.”178
In closing, the majority refuted three arguments set forth in the dissenting
opinion: First, the majority noted that unlike the MHRA, discrimination on the
basis of an individual’s status as a recipient of public assistance is not prohibited
under the federal Fair Housing Act.179 The Court found the dissent’s reliance on
the otherwise broad definition of discrimination under the FHA to be misguided as
compared with the “MHRA’s relatively narrow prohibition of ‘refus[al] to rent or
impos[istion of] different terms of tenancy’” based primarily on a person’s status as
a public assistance recipient.180 Second, the majority criticized the dissent’s
interpretation of section 4583, suggesting that it would “effectively compel
Maine’s landlords to participate in a voluntary federal housing subsidy program or
risk having to litigate whether their decision not to participate is based on a
‘business necessity.’”181 Given the Court’s previous holding in Catir,182 the
majority was unwilling to “interpret a statute to effect” a modification of the law,
absent “clear and explicit statutory language” demonstrating legislative intent to do
so.183 Thus, the majority dismissed the dissent’s assertion that the Court’s
interpretation of the MHRA would allow “landlords to avoid liability by simply
alleging business necessity rather than proving it.”184 Instead, the majority found it
unnecessary to reach the issue of business necessity because it concluded that
sections 4582 and 4583 do not authorize disparate impact liability for claims of
housing discrimination in connection with a landlord’s refusal to participate in the
Section 8 voucher program, and therefore, Dussault had failed to make out a prima
facie case of unlawful housing discrimination under the disparate impact theory.185
The Court affirmed.186
176. Id. ¶ 25.
177. Id. ¶ 26.
178. Id.
179. Id. ¶ 27.
180. Id. (alteration in original).
181. Id. ¶ 28.
182. See Catir v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Human Servs., 543 A.2d 356, 358 (Me. 1988) (holding that the
nursing home did not violate the MHRA when it offered Medicaid recipients “the same terms of tenancy
offered to any other individual”).
183. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 28, 86 A.3d 52 (quoting Caron v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 27, 594
A.2d 560, 563 (Me. 1991)).
184. Id. ¶ 29.
185. Id.
186. Id. ¶ 30.
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E. The Concurrence
Concurring in the result and the Court’s reasoning, Justice Alexander joined
the Court’s opinion and wrote separately to “note that the Maine Legislature has
explicitly rejected the change in the law urged by the Dissent.”187 Justice
Alexander further emphasized that the dissent’s approach “would interpret current
Maine Law to mandate acceptance of onerous contract conditions” of Section 8
programs, notwithstanding the capacity of some landlords to bear the cost of
demonstrating “business necessity” to avoid the contractual requirements.188
Pointing to the legislative history of section 4582, Justice Alexander noted that
the provision, which would have required landlords to accept the Section 8
“contractual burdens[,] was stricken from the legislation.”189 As a matter of
statutory construction, Justice Alexander cautioned that “when a law has been
interpreted by a judicial opinion, we do not later change that interpretation absent
‘clear and explicit’ statutory language demonstrating legislative intent to change
prior case law.”190
F. The Dissent
Justice Levy, writing for two other dissenting justices, agreed with two
conclusions of the Court: that the MHRA does “not make participation in the
Section 8 housing assistance program mandatory” and that landlords are prohibited
from intentionally discriminating against public assistance recipients under the
Act.191 The dissent, however, concluded that the MHRA “prohibits housing
practices that have a disparate impact on recipients of public assistance when such
decisions are not justified by a business necessity.”192 Justice Levy also disagreed
with the Court’s conclusion that Coach Lantern did not “refuse to rent” to Dussault
within the meaning of section 4582.193
The dissent first considered “whether Coach Lantern’s actions exposed it to
liability pursuant to the MHRA.”194 In determining whether Coach Lantern was
liable, the dissent observed that the majority opinion relied heavily on the Law
Court’s previous decision in Catir,195 “which was decided before the ‘business
necessity’ defense was added to section 4583 in 2007.”196 The dissent found the
Catir decision “inapposite to the present case for several reasons.”197 After
distinguishing that the Catir “summary judgment record demonstrated that the
nursing home’s refusal to serve the plaintiffs as Medicaid patients was . . . based on
its decision to no longer accept the Medicaid reimbursement rate,” the dissent
observed that there was “no reason to consider whether the nursing home’s refusal
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. ¶ 31 (Alexander, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 36 (quoting Caron v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 27, 594 A.2d 560, 563 (Me. 1991)).
Id. ¶ 38 (Levy, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 39.
543 A.2d 356 (Me. 1988).
Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 39, 86 A.3d 52 (Levy, J., dissenting).
Id. ¶ 40.
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to accept the Medicaid reimbursement rate” was justified by business necessity,
because the defense was added to section 4583 over twenty years later.198 Thus,
the dissent observed that the issue in Catir did not concern a refusal to rent to
Medicaid recipients, but rather a question of whether different terms of tenancy had
been imposed.199 In relying on Catir to control the outcome of the case, the dissent
found that the Court had “adopt[ed] too narrow a view of what it means for a
landlord to ‘refuse to rent’ to a prospective tenant.”200 The dissent concluded that
“regardless of the reason for its refusal, Coach Lantern ‘refused to rent’ to Dussault
pursuant to the plain language of section 4582.”201
The dissent also asserted that, despite Coach Lantern’s willingness to rent to
Dussault, it would only have done so if Dussault “relinquished her status as a
recipient of public assistance.”202 Moreover, the dissent stated that under the
Court’s reading of section 4582, a landlord could refuse “to rent to a tenant based
on the tenant’s protected status so long as the landlord simply asserted that it was
‘willing’ to accept the tenant should she change her status.”203 Thus, under this
alternative view of the facts, the dissent concluded that Coach Lantern’s actions
constituted a refusal to rent to Dussault within the meaning of section 4582.204
Finally, the dissent articulated three reasons why the majority’s interpretation
of the language “primarily because of” incorrectly precluded the availability of
disparate impact liability for public assistance recipients.205 First, the dissent
asserted that the term “primarily because of” could have more than one meaning:
“either (1) that the decision had a discriminatory purpose, or (2) that the decision
resulted in a disparate impact on members of a protected group that was
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.”206 Second, the dissent
reasoned that a structural interpretation of section 4582 as recognizing “a facially
neutral housing practice that has a disparate impact” was consistent with the
availability of a business necessity defense under section 4583, which creates a
defense to liability under the MHRA for housing decisions “not based on” one of
the protected classifications.207 Furthermore, in evaluating the statute’s legislative
history, the dissent stated that the “Legislature’s intent to subject claims of housing
discrimination based on the receipt of public assistance payments to disparate
impact analysis, and to permit landlords to justify their practices based on a
showing of business necessity, could not be clearer.”208 The dissent further refuted
the concurrence’s assertion that legislative intent could be gleaned from the
Judiciary Committee’s removal of section 2 from L.D. 685,209 because the same
Committee also expressly stated its goal of applying disparate impact liability to
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id. ¶ 41.
Id. ¶ 42.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 44.
Id. ¶ 46.
Id. ¶ 47.
Id. ¶ 48.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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“unreasonable housing practices.”210 Third, the dissent stated that recognition of
disparate impact liability as within sections 4582 and 4583 was consistent with
federal law because “every federal court of appeals but one has concluded that” the
antidiscrimination provision211 of the FHA “creates liability for intent-neutral
disparate impact.”212
Thus, on the merits of the case, the dissent determined that Coach Lantern’s
“refusal to include the HUD tenancy addendum in its leases effectively excludes
one hundred percent of Section 8 recipients from renting from Coach Lantern.”213
According to the dissent, when the “inexorable zero exists, the prima facie
inference of discrimination becomes strong.”214 The dissent observed that
“[a]lthough Coach Lantern summarized the conditions of the addendum that it
objects to, it failed to assert facts from which a fact-finder could determine that the
conditions would interfere with any substantial, legitimate, and nondiscriminatory
interest associated with its business.”215 Thus, the dissent found that Coach
Lantern failed to meet its burden of “showing that an actual business necessity
justified its decision to refuse to include Section 8 addenda in its lease
agreements.”216 The dissent concluded by acknowledging that the MHRA “does
not compel landlords to participate in the Section 8 housing voucher program so
long as the landlord’s decision does not intentionally discriminate against, or result
in a disparate impact on, recipients of public assistance.”217 Given Dussault’s
unrebutted prima facie case, the dissent would have vacated and remanded for
entry of a judgment in Dussault’s favor.218
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Likely Impact of Dussault
The Court’s holding—that Dussault failed to make out a prima facie case on
each of her claims of liability and that disparate impact liability is unavailable for
Section 8 recipients under the MHRA—represented a reasonable, but highly
strained construction of the statute’s plain language and legislative history. The
majority’s interpretation of the availability of fair housing protections for Section 8
recipients under the MHRA was particularly narrow in light of the statute’s
apparent ambiguity and the majority’s explicit recognition that the MHRA’s
purpose is to protect public assistance recipients’ rights to secure decent housing.219

210. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 50, 86 A.3d 52 (Levy, J., dissenting). The 2007 amendment to the
MHRA expressly stated that the MHRA was amended to “prohibit unreasonable housing practices that
have a disparate impact on the basis of . . . the receipt of public assistance payments.” L.D. 685,
Summary (123rd Legis. 2007).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
212. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 52, 86 A.3d 52 (Levy, J., dissenting).
213. Id. ¶ 55.
214. Id. (citation omitted).
215. Id. ¶ 57.
216. Id. ¶ 59.
217. Id. ¶ 60.
218. Id.
219. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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Fair housing advocates were likely and justifiably disappointed by the outcome of
the appeal.220 What’s of greater concern is that the Court’s holding could be cited
as precedent to nullify the availability of protections under the MHRA for nonSection 8 public assistance recipients in Maine, particularly if the applicable
housing subsidy or general assistance program includes administrative
requirements.
What is clear is that landlords may see Dussault as a license to more easily
deny housing opportunities to holders of Section 8 vouchers, especially in light of
Maine’s competitive apartment rental market.221 With more than 10,000 Mainers
on Section 8 waiting lists, 30,000 individuals eligible for Section 8 vouchers, and a
“tight rental market” overall, “[t]here are many applicants and it’s certainly making
it harder on Section 8.”222 Thus, Dussault provides a decreased incentive for
landlords to accept Section 8 tenants,223 because landlords need only state that they
would gladly rent to Section 8 tenants but for the requirements of the tenancy
addendum or the program overall. This does not seem to comport with the statute’s
remedial purpose.224
Maine faces particularly acute housing affordability issues, with one in three
renters spending more than half of their income on housing costs.225 Although
Maine needs approximately 56,000 affordable family rental units and 5,180 senior
units to fill demand, development of new affordable rental units is often opposed
by local communities fearful of adverse impacts.226 At the same time, existing
rental stock has declined since 2000 and affordable rental housing for the lowincome population in Portland is “limited.”227
When a prospective tenant has been explicitly denied housing on account of
race, gender, the presence of children, or a variety of other protected classifications,
the legal claim is clear and unambiguous.228 Landlords, however, possess

220. Cf. Beaulieu v. City of Lewiston, 440 A.2d 334, 346-47 (Me. 1982) (holding that the City’s
automatic denial of mortgage payment assistance to those eligible for general assistance did not comport
with the statutory mandate that need is the exclusive criterion for relief under the general assistance
program). “Shelter purchased by its occupant is no less essential to his or her ‘maintenance’ than rented
shelter is to the tenant. The continuing availability of that shelter is essential to the applicant’s
maintenance, stability, and even survival.” Id. at 346.
221. See Tom Porter, Section 8 Housing Cuts Affecting Maine Landlords, MPBN.NET (Aug. 5,
2013),
https://www.mpbn.net/Home/tabid/36/ctl/ViewItem/mid/5347/ItemId/29280/Default.aspx
[hereinafter Section 8 Housing Cuts] (reporting on the difficult situation “facing people who live, or who
want to live, in federally-subsidized housing” in Maine).
222. Id.
223. See id. Other landlords assert, however, that “people living in Section 8 housing are usually
good tenants, and many property owners are drawn to the prospect of having them . . . because the rent
is guaranteed . . . [and] landlords have more leverage over Section 8 tenants should they misbehave.”
Id.
224. Cf. Coker v. City of Lewiston, 1998 ME 93, ¶ 7, 710 A.2d 909 (“Maine’s general assistance
statutes must be construed liberally to effect their remedial purposes and achieve their humanitarian
aims.”) (emphasis added).
225. Blue Ribbon Report, supra note 69, at 7. The Report also notes that roughly half of Maine’s
148,050 renters earned less than 50% of the area median income. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 8.
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012).
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sufficient business and legal savvy to avoid such obvious distinctions.229 Instead,
landlords may resort to more subtle, but equally damaging forms of
discrimination.230 This may include discrimination on account of an individual’s
use of public assistance to pay the rent.231 Thus, a landlord’s knowledge that a
prospective tenant will rely on receipt of public assistance may also stand as a
proxy or pretext for discrimination because of other protected classifications.232
Those most impacted by source of income discrimination include individuals
living with disabilities, single female heads of household, families with children,
and members of racial minority groups.233 Moreover, the impact of public
assistance discrimination has long-term effects.234 Despite the multiple objectives
of national fair housing laws that envision communities with truly “integrated and
balanced living patterns,”235 a landlord’s “no-voucher” policy may exacerbate the
shift of low income tenants into substandard housing within impoverished
neighborhoods.236
B. The Dussault Majority Reasonably Interpreted the MHRA’s Fair Housing
Laws as Precluding Claims of Disparate Impact Made by Section 8
Recipients, but the Interpretation Leads to Illogical Results.
Although the Dussault majority reasonably interpreted sections 4582 and 4583
as precluding disparate impact liability claims made by Section 8 recipients, its
conclusion leads to illogical results. As discussed below, there are three reasons
why the majority reasonably construed the MHRA’s public assistance protections
as precluding claims of disparate impact liability asserted by Section 8 recipients.
However, under traditional canons of statutory construction in Maine, the
majority’s interpretation of the ambiguous statutory language leads to “absurd,
illogical, or inconsistent results.”237
229. See Natalie Moore, New report reveals pervasive discrimination in housing voucher program,
WBEZ.ORG (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.wbez.org/news/new-report-reveals-pervasive-discriminationhousing-voucher-program-109946 (reporting on the use of trained investigators to assess fair housing
practices in Chicago).
230. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 468-73 (2001) (defining second generation discrimination as claims which
“involve patterns of interaction among groups . . . that, over time, exclude nondominant groups,” and
suggesting that second generation discrimination “does not evoke the first generation’s clear and vivid
moral imagery—the exclusionary sign on the door or the fire hose directed at schoolchildren”).
231. See Flagg, supra note 43, at 202 (stating that landlords commit “source of income
discrimination” when they “fail to make rental units available to prospective tenants . . . because of
how” the individual plans to pay the rent).
232. See id. (“While landlords may openly refuse prospective tenants based on their status as voucher
holders or recipients of public assistance, denial in such cases may be a thinly veiled means of rejecting
tenants on the basis of race, familial status or disability.”).
233. See id. at 206.
234. See id. at 208 ( “Where a child grows up is directly related to where he or she can go to school,
and living in a low-income, racially segregated neighborhood with under-funded public schools can be a
significant barrier to racial and economic integration for that family.”).
235. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (citation omitted).
236. See Daniel, supra note 38, at 783-84 (suggesting that landlords use “no-voucher” policies to
prevent members of other protected classes from accessing their rental units).
237. Coker v. City of Lewiston, 1998 ME 93, ¶ 7, 710 A.2d 909.
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1. The Majority Reasonably Interpreted the MHRA as Precluding Disparate
Impact Claims Made by Section 8 Recipients.
The majority’s interpretation of the MHRA is justifiable on three grounds:
First, the statute’s plain language demonstrates that Section 8 recipients are not
entitled to the same scope of protection as other classifications within the MHRA.
Second, the statute’s recent legislative history evidences a specific legislative intent
to limit the availability of disparate impact claims to protected characteristics, and
not because of the requirements of any public assistance programs. Third, a brief
examination of a similar housing discrimination case from Massachusetts helps
demonstrate why the majority correctly distinguished between two types of public
assistance discrimination: “status-based” discrimination and “program
requirements” discrimination.
In DiLiddo v. Oxford Street Realty, Inc.,238 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court interpreted a state fair housing law that prohibits landlords from
discriminating against tenants who receive housing subsidies either “because the
individual is such a recipient,” or “because of any requirement” of the public
assistance program.239 The court held that the landlord’s refusal to rent an
apartment to a housing subsidy recipient, because of the voucher program’s lease
requirements, fell “squarely within the ambit of the prohibition of the statute.”240
The court first reviewed its previous decision in Attorney General v. Brown,241
which distinguished between discrimination “solely” because a prospective tenant
holds a housing voucher and discrimination that occurs because a landlord refuses
to accept the requirements of the housing program.242 The court observed that the
legislature specifically amended the statutory language two years after the Brown
decision, and “added new language making it unlawful for a landlord to
discriminate against a housing subsidy recipient either ‘because the individual is
such a recipient,’ or ‘because of any requirement of such public assistance, rental
assistance, or housing subsidy program.’”243 Thus, the 1990 amendment to the
Commonwealth’s law codified two “kinds of housing discrimination that [the]
court had parsed so carefully in Brown” as unlawful.244
Unlike the Massachusetts law at issue in DiLiddo, the plain language of the
MHRA’s fair housing provisions proscribe only “status-based” discrimination.
Section 4581 of the MHRA declares a civil right to “decent housing,” while
guarding against discrimination on the basis of nine characteristics.245 By the
statute’s plain language, the right of an individual to obtain housing “without
discrimination because of race, color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental
disability, religion, ancestry, national origin or familial status” does not extend to
238. 876 N.E.2d 421 (Mass. 2007).
239. Id. at 422.
240. Id. at 429.
241. 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1109 (Mass. 1987) (holding that a landlord’s refusal to accept a Section 8
tenant because of the requirements of the Section 8 program did “not necessarily equate with
discrimination ‘solely’ on the basis of the individual’s status as a Section 8 certificate holder”).
242. DiLiddo, 876 N.E.at 428.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. 5 M.R.S.A. § 4581 (2014).
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an individual whose status includes receipt of public assistance and housing
subsidies.246 Although the Maine Legislature has twice had the opportunity to add
receipt of public assistance to section 4581’s listing, the Legislature has not
incorporated such protections into the statute’s express listing of those entitled to a
civil right to decent housing.247 Thus, the plain language of section 4581 supports
the majority’s view that an individual’s status as a recipient of public assistance is
distinct from other forms of discrimination protected under the statute.
Similarly, the text of section 4582 makes a distinction between the nine
classifications specified within section 4581248 and the class of individuals who
receive protections on account of their status as public assistance recipients.
Whereas the former receive broader protections under the MHRA, discrimination
against public aid recipients is only prohibited in the context of “refus[ing] to rent
or impos[ing] different terms of tenancy . . . primarily because of the individual’s
status as recipient.”249 Thus, by the statute’s plain language, the question of
whether disparate impact liability is available for Section 8 recipients turns on
whether an individual’s “status as recipient” includes participation in the Section 8
voucher program, as well as the landlord requirements contained therein. In other
words, does a landlord’s refusal to affirmatively accept the requirements of Section
8 transform a landlord’s willingness to rent into unlawful housing discrimination?
Finally, the legislative history of sections 4582 and 4583 is instructive and
supports the majority’s view that “status-based discrimination” does not open the
door to a claim for disparate impact housing discrimination on the basis of receipt
of Section 8 assistance. In 2007, the Judiciary Committee considered amending
section 4582 to include the exact same “program-requirements” provision that
Massachusetts codified in 1990 and later interpreted in DiLiddo.250 Whereas the
language as originally proposed for section 4582 would have broadened the
MHRA’s protections for recipients of public assistance—codifying both “statusbased” and “program-requirements” discrimination—the final amendments to the
MHRA dropped the latter type, and at the same time, modified the language of
section 4583 to clarify the availability of a “business necessity” defense for neutral
housing practices with disparate impacts on any protected class.251 Thus, had the
Legislature intended to extend disparate impact liability to “program-requirements”

246. See id.
247. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
248. For example, section 4582 of the MHRA provided that it is unlawful housing discrimination for
an individual to undertake the following actions on the basis of “race or color, sex, sexual orientation,
physical or mental disability, religion, ancestry, national origin or familial status”: “mak[ing] or
caus[ing] to be made any written or oral inquiry”; “refus[ing] to sell, rent lease, let or otherwise deny to
or withhold” a housing accommodation; “issu[ing] any advertisement . . . that indicates any preference,
limitation, or specification or discrimination”; “discriminat[ing] against . . . in the price, terms,
conditions or privileges of the sale, rental or lease”; “evict[ing] or attempt[ing] to evict any tenant”;
“fail[ing] or refus[ing] to show . . . any accommodation . . . or to misrepresent . . . the availability or
asking price . . . or to fail to communicate . . . any offer . . . made by any applicant.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 4582
(2007), repealed by P.L. 2011, ch. 613, §§ 11-12 (effective Sept. 1, 2012) (codified at 5 M.R.S.A. §
4581-A (2014)).
249. Id.
250. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
251. See discussion supra Part II B.2.
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discrimination, the Legislature could have expressly included that language in
section 4583. Instead, the Legislature only enacted disparate impact liability for
claims of “status-based” housing discrimination, as well as claims brought because
of the nine other classifications listed in section 4581.252
2. The Majority’s Interpretation of the Public Assistance Protections Under the
MHRA for Section 8 Recipients Renders the Statute a Nullity.
The Law Court set forth the guidelines for statutory construction of general
assistance statutes in Coker v. City of Lewiston.253 When interpreting a statute, the
Court first looks to the “plain meaning of the statutory language as a means of
effecting the legislative intent.”254 Only if the statutory language is ambiguous will
the Court “examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history.”255
The Court interprets the statutory scheme “from which the language arises” in
order “to achieve a harmonious result.”256 Finally, the Court “will not construe
statutory language to effect absurd, illogical, or inconsistent results.”257
Given the 4-3 split decision of the Court,258 the statutory language of section
4582, which made it unlawful to “refuse to rent or impose different terms of
tenancy . . . primarily because of the individual’s status” as a public assistance
recipient, was almost certainly ambiguous. In light of this ambiguity, the
majority’s heavy reliance259 on the legislature’s 2007 rejection of the programrequirements provision was inconsistent with the majority’s simultaneous
recognition that the legislative intent included a desire to “protect public assistance
recipients’ rights to secure decent housing.”260 Moreover, had the Court looked
further back to the legislative history surrounding the actual 1975 enactment (rather
than lack of enactment of the 2007 amendment) of the protections against housing
discrimination for recipients of public assistance, the majority could just as easily
have ascertained a legislative intent to remedy “[o]ne of the largest housing
problems” faced by Maine families: “discrimination by potential landlords against
families receiving public assistance.”261 Although the statute’s language was
ambiguous, the purpose of the statute was clear: “to enable those citizens of Maine
most in need of housing to have a fair and equal chance of obtaining it.”262 Today,
this includes participation in the most popular form of housing assistance in

252. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
253. 1998 ME 93, 710 A.2d 909.
254. Id. ¶ 7.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
259. Cf. Covanta Maine LLC v. Pub, Utils. Comm’n, 2012 ME 74, ¶ 12, 44 A.3d 960 (stating that as
a matter of statutory construction, the Court may consider legislation subsequently enacted “in
ascertaining the meaning of a term when the amendment is meant to clarify prior legislation, not alter
it.”).
260. Dussault, 2014 ME 8, ¶ 18, 86 A.3d 52.
261. L.D. 327, Statement of Fact (107th Legis. 1975).
262. Id.

210

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1

America.263
Despite such legislative intent, the majority’s holding renders the statute a
nullity and potentially leads to inconsistent results because a landlord can decline to
rent to a prospective tenant any time the tenant relies on a form of housing
assistance that also includes administrative requirements for the landlord. In this
respect, the majority’s significant reliance on Catir264 is also misplaced because,
unlike the plaintiffs in Catir, Section 8 recipients can afford to pay the rent.265
Thus, the only remaining issue is whether a landlord can assert a business necessity
for declining to rent, a provision which the majority’s interpretation also makes
unnecessary within the overall statutory scheme as applied to Section 8 recipients.
If this is not the case, then what remains of the statute’s purpose is a legislative
intent to protect public assistance recipients from housing discrimination solely on
account of the stereotypes or generalized bias against such recipients. Because any
form of public assistance is likely to include programmatic requirements for its
participants, only incompetent or unthinking landlords would fit within such a
construction, leaving many low-income individuals without a fair and equal chance
of obtaining decent housing.
In this regard, the dissent’s assertion that Coach Lantern failed to rebut
Dussault’s prima facie case should have prevailed,266 because a landlord who
refuses to rent to a Section 8 recipient because of the program’s administrative
requirements should be required to demonstrate that the voluntary federal program
poses burdens that are inconsistent with business necessity, and Coach Lantern
made no such showing. Nevertheless, only the legislature can achieve such a
result.
C. The Maine Legislature Should Amend the MHRA’s Definition of
Discrimination on the Basis of Status as a Public Assistance
Recipient to Include Section 8 Recipients.
The Legislature should consider amending section 4581-A(4) of the MHRA to
expressly include recipients of Section 8 vouchers.267 The Section 8 program is the
largest and most expansive housing subsidy program in the nation.268 Accordingly,
the Legislature should reflect in current law the legal reach of the housing program
that most directly impacts Maine’s landlords and rental population. Although

263. See Bruce Zucker & Kiren Dosanjh Zucker, Section 8 Voucher Program: The Benefits and
Pitfalls of Renting to Residential Tenants Receiving Federally Subsidized Housing, 43 REAL ESTATE
L.J. 38, 38-39 (2014) (stating that Section 8 is the “dominant form of federal housing assistance” and
that over two million households participate in the program).
264. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
265. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
266. See discussion supra Part III.F.
267. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 2-1402.21(e) (2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659a.421(1)(d) (West
2014).
268. See America’s Rental Housing: Evolving Markets and Needs, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES
OF HARVARD UNIV. 35 (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/
jchs_americas_rental_housing_2013_1_0.pdf (identifying 2.2 million users of voucher subsidies
nationwide, making Section 8 the largest federal housing assistance program).
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controversial,269 doing so would bring much needed clarity and relief to an area of
fair housing law likely to see increasing activity.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 8 tenants like Nicole Dussault were unfortunately set back by the
Court’s decision. Although the majority reasonably interpreted that disparate
impact liability is not available for claims of Section 8 recipients brought under the
MHRA because of the voluntary nature of the federally funded Section 8 housing
program, the Court’s approach also appeared inconsistent with general principles of
statutory construction. Accordingly, the decision should be narrowly read and
limited in precedential value to just precluding disparate claims brought by Section
8 recipients under the MHRA. Moreover, the Maine Legislature is in the best
position to clarify the statute’s broader protections and bolster its effectiveness by
expressly including Section 8 coverage. Irrespective of one’s beliefs concerning
the efficacy of Section 8,270 Maine’s low-income housing population and apartment
owners should be encouraged to operate transparently and know with certainty
where they stand.271

269. See Manny Fernandez, Mayor Vetoes Bill Protecting Section 8 Tenants From Landlord Bias,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/01/nyregion/01housing.html (describing a
New York City bill that would have made it illegal for landlords to refuse tenants who intended to pay
rent using Section 8 vouchers).
270. See Evie Blad, 50 Years Later, Housing Programs’ Reach is Limited, EDUC. WEEK (Mar. 25,
2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/03/26/26wophousing_ep.h33.html (providing an indepth review and analysis of diverse perspectives regarding the low-income housing crisis in America).
271. See Zucker & Zucker, supra note 263, at 45-46 (“Providing low-income families the benefit of
safe, sanitary, and affordable housing while simultaneously giving private property owners the ability to
earn reasonable profits” makes the Section 8 program a “successful investment for all stakeholders.”).

